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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Pursuant
one count of

plea agreement, sixty-three-year-old
abuse of a child

age of sixteen

\A/inn pleaded guilty to
Mr. Winn later filed

a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, which the district court denied. The district court
subsequently imposed a unified sentence of twenty-five years, with twelve years fixed.
On appeal,
the motion
abused its d

Winn asserts that the

court abused its discretion when it denied

withdraw his guilty plea.
when it imposed

Winn also

that the district court

unified sentence of twenty-five years, with

twelve years fixed, upon him following his plea of guilty.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Garden City Police investigated allegations that Mr. Winn had sexually abused
his granddaughter, J H. (Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), pp.2-3.) 1
Mr. Winn's grandson, M.H., had reportedly disclosed seeing Mr. Winn sexually
molesting J.H. (PSI, p.3.) During CARES interviews, both J.H. and M.H. reported that
Mr. Winn had sexually abused J.H. (PSI, p.4.)
Mr. Winn was interviewed about the allegations, and he stated that he had
memory lapses due to using methamphetamine. (PSI, p.3.) He acknowledged that it
was possible that he had touched J.H., but stated that drugs made him do things he
would not normally do. (PSI, p.3.) Mr. Winn requested a polygraph examination, and
during the pre-test interview he stated that he had oral-genital contact with J.H. two or
three times, and manual-genital contact with her five or six times, around December of

All page cites to the PSI and attached documents refer to the 392-page "WINN
psi.pdf".
1

1

2008.

(PSI, p.3.)

J.H. was about seven or eight years old at the time.

(PSI, p.4.)

Mr. Winn prepared and signed a written statement as to the oral-genital and manual-

genital contact, and then told the polygrapher that he no longer wanted to participate in

a polygraph examination without consulting an attorney. (PSI, p.3.)
Mr. Winn was placed under arrest by his probation officer and booked into the
Ada County Jail. (PSI, p.3.) He was charged with one count of lewd conduct 1Nith a
minor under sixteen, felony, in violation of I.C. § 18-1508. (R., pp.6-7.) He was also
charged with a sentencing enhancement for prior registerable sex offense conviction
pursuant to I.C. § 19-25208, on account of his alleged prior conviction for lewd conduct
with a minor under sixteen, felony, in 1993. (R., pp.9-10.) Mr. Winn initially entered a

plea of not guilty. (R., p.29.)
Mr. Winn later entered into a plea agreement. (Tr., p.5, Ls.19-24.) Pursuant to
the plea agreement, Mr. Winn agreed to plead guilty to amended charges of one count
of sexual abuse of a child under the age of sixteen years, felony, in violation of
I.C. § 18-1506.

(R., pp.57-58; Tr., p.8, Ls.6-9.)

The State agreed to dismiss the

sentencing enhancement. (Tr., p.8, Ls.9-10.) Thus, Mr. Winn entered an Alford plea 2 to
the amended charges. (R., p. 59; Tr., p.7, Ls.17-21.) Mr. Winn indicated that he had a
fuzzy memory of what happened, because he was using methamphetamine at the time.
(Tr., p.13, Ls.13-22.) The district court accepted Mr. Winn's guilty plea. (R., p.59.)
Mr. Winn subsequently filed a Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea.

(R., p.72.) He

based the motion to withdraw guilty plea on additional information, disclosed by his
family members after the plea, that allegations about M.H. abusing J.H. started in

2

See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).

2

2006. 3

(Tr., p.25, Ls.9-14.)

The district court did not find just cause to allow the

withdrawal of the guilty plea, and dismissed the motion. (R., p.74; Tr., p.26, Ls.11-14.)
At the sentencing hearing, the State recommended a unified sentence of twentyfive years, with twenty years fixed. (R., p.76, Tr., p.39, L.21 - p.40, L.1.) Mr. Winn's
counsel recommended a five year fixed sentence followed by five to ten years
indeterminate. (Tr., p.43, Ls. 1-3, 10-11.) The district court imposed a unified sentence
of twenty-five years, with twelve years fixed. (R., pp.77-79; Tr., p.45, Ls.13-15.)
Mr. Winn filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court's judgment of
conviction. (R., pp.84-86.)
Later, Mr. Winn filed an Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35) Motion for
Reduction of Sentence and for Leave. (Motion for Reduction of Sentence and for Leave
(Oct. 22, 2012).) The district court denied the Rule 35 motion. (Order Denying Motion
for Sentence Reduction (Jan. 2, 2013).) On appeal, Mr. V\/inn does not challenge the
denial of his Rule 35 motion.

3

Before the plea, Mr. Winn was aware of information about M.H. abusing J.H., but not
that the allegations of that abuse started in 2006. (Tr., p.25, Ls.9-14.)
3

ISSUES
1.

Did the district couri abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Winn's motion to
withdraw his guilty plea?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of
twenty-five years, with twelve years fixed, upon Mr. Winn following his plea of
guilty?

4

ARGUMENT
I.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Winn's Motion To Withdraw
His Guilty Plea

A.

Introduction
Mr. Winn asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his

motion to withdraw his guiity plea. "The decision to grant a motion to withdraw a guilty
plea is left to the sound discretion of the district court, and such discretion should be
liberally applied."

State v. Arthur, 145 Idaho 219, 222 (2008).

An appellate court's

review of the denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea "is limited to determining
whether the district court exercised sound judicial discretion as distinguished from
arbitrary action." Id. If a defendant files the motion before sentencing, the defendant
"need only show a 'just reason' to withdraw the plea."

Id.

Here, Mr. Winn filed the

motion before sentencing, and before he learned of the content of the PSI.

(See

Tr., p.27, Ls.3-5.) Thus, he was only required to show a "just reason" to withdraw his
guilty plea. Arthur, 145 Idaho at 222.
Here, Mr. Winn showed a just reason to withdraw his plea, because there was
newly discovered evidence that could plausibly have motivated a reasonable person in
his position not to plead guilty.

The State did not demonstrate that prejudice would

result from withdrawal of the plea. Thus, Mr. Winn submits that the district court abused
its discretion when it denied his motion to withdraw guilty plea.

5

B.

Mr. Winn Showed A Just Reason To Withdraw The Plea, Because There Was
Newly Discovered Evidence That Could Plausibly Have Motivated A Reasonable
Person In His Position Not To Plead Guilty
Mr. Winn asserts that he showed a just reason to withdraw his guilty plea,

because there was newly discovered evidence that could plausibly have motivated a
reasonable person in his position not to plead guilty.

It appears that whether newly

discovered evidence may be a just reason to permit a defendant to withdraw a guilty
plea is a question of first impression for this Court. 4
As a preliminary matter, Mr. Winn respectfully recommends that this Court hold
that newly discovered evidence, that could plausibly have motivated a reasonable
person in the defendant's position not to plead guilty, is a just reason to permit the
defendant to withdraw a guilty plea. The Ninth Circuit has ruled, under the federal "fair
and just reason" standard for withdrawing a guilty plea before sentencing, that newly
discovered evidence is sufficient to justify the withdrawal of a defendant's guilty plea if
the evidence "was relevant evidence in [the defendant's] favor that could have at least
plausibly motivated a reasonable person in [the defendant's] position not to have pied
guilty had he known about the evidence prior to pleading." United States v. Garcia, 401
F.3d 1008, 1011-12 (9th Cir. 2005).
While the Ninth Circuit's decision in Garcia is not binding on this Court, Mr. Winn
respectfully recommends that this Court adopt its reasoning. The federal standard for
withdrawing a guilty plea before sentencing is nearly identical to the Idaho standard.

Cf State v. Hocker, 115 Idaho 137, 139 n.2 (Ct. App. 1988) (determining that a
defense counsel's "vague allusion" to newly discovered evidence, without any
description of the evidence, was insufficient to show a just reason for withdrawing a
defendant's guilty plea). However, the Idaho Court of Appeals in Hocker stated that it
"did not suggest that newly discovered evidence never can be an adequate ground to
withdraw a plea. We simply hold that the nature of the evidence, and its potential
relevance to this case, were not sufficiently established on the record." Id.
4

6

Under the federal standard, "[a] defendant may withdraw a guilty plea after its
acceptance but before sentencing if the defendant shows 'a fair and just reason for
requesting the withdrawal."' Id. (quoting Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (d)(2)(B)). Under the Idaho
standard, "when the motion is made before sentencing, a defendant need only show a
'just reason' to withdraw the plea."

Arthur, 145 Idaho at 222 (quoting I.C.R. 33(c);

State v. Ballard, 114 Idaho 799, 801 (1988)).

Additionally, both the federal and Idaho cases on the subject declare that a
district court should liberally apply its discretion to grant a motion to withdraw guilty plea.

E.g., Garcia, 40·1 F.3d at 1011 ("[T]he fair and just reason standard is applied liberally."
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Arthur, 145 Idaho at 222 ("[SJuch discretion should
be liberally applied.")

It appears that the Ninth Circuit adopted newly discovered

evidence as a "just and fair reason" for withdrawing a guilty plea with this liberal
discretion in mind. See United States v. Rios-Ortiz, 830 F.2d 1067, 1069 (9th Cir. 1987)
(stating that the "fair and just reason" standard "is a more lenient test than that applied
on post-sentencing review," and that "newly discovered evidence" is a possible "reason
for withdrawing [a defendant's] plea that did not exist when he pleaded guilty"). Idaho's
standard demands

a similarly liberal discretion.

Thus,

Mr. Winn

respectfully

recommends that this Court hold that newly discovered evidence, that could plausibly
have motivated a reasonable person in the defendant's position not to plead guilty, is a
just reason to permit the defendant to withdraw a guilty plea.
In this case, there was newly discovered evidence that could plausibly have
motivated a reasonable person in Mr. Winn's position not to plead guilty. At the motion
to withdraw guilty plea hearing, Mr. Winn's counsel told the district court that Mr. Winn
had "indicated that post plea, he received some additional information from family
7

members that he was not privy to prior that he thinks would affect the state's case."
(Tr., p.20, Ls.3-6.) Mr. Winn's counsel later elaborated: 'They did disclose additional
information about [M.H.] abusing the same victim, and that was prior to plea. But in
conversations he has had with family members, his understanding is that these
allegations basically started in 2006." (Tr., p.25, Ls.9-14.) Mr. Winn's counsel stated
that Mr. Winn "believes . . . that that information changes the state's case in some
regard, and he maintains his innocence and therefore he would like to proceed to trial."
(Tr., p.25, Ls.15-18.)
The additional information could plausibly have motivated a reasonable person in
Mr. Winn's position not to plead guilty.

Unlike with the "vague allusion" to newly

discovered evidence in Hocker, 115 Idaho at 139 n.2, the nature of this newly
discovered evidence and its potential relevance were sufficiently established in this
case. The additional information that the allegations about M.H. abusing J.H. started in
2006 raises new questions about Mr. Winn's involvement in the abuse. Mr. Winn had a
fuzzy memory concerning the abuse at issue here (Tr., p.13, Ls.13-22), and the
additional information from his family member that the allegations about M.H abusing
J.H. started in 2006-some two years before the 2008 abuse at issue here-suggests
that there could have been an alternate perpetrator.

If a reasonable person in

Mr. Winn's position had known about this additional information, it could have plausibly
motivated him not to plead guilty. As Mr. Winn's counsel put it, Mr. Winn believed "that
that information changes the state's case in some regard, and he maintains his
innocence and therefore would like to proceed to trial." (Tr., p.25, Ls.15-18.) Thus, the
additional information, as newly discovered evidence, was a just reason to permit

8

Mr. Winn to withdraw his guilty plea.

In sum, Mr. Winn showed a just reason to

withdraw the plea.

C.

The State Did Not Demonstrate That Prejudice V\/ould Result From The
Withdrawal Of Mr. Winn's Plea
Once a defendant has shown a just reason for withdrawing a guilty plea, "the

state may avoid the granting of the motion by demonstrating that prejudice would result
from withdrawal of the plea."
quotation marks omitted).

State v. Dopp, 124 Idaho 481, 485 (1993) (internal

Here, the State did not demonstrate that prejudice would

result from the withdrawal of Mr. Winn's plea.

At the motion to withdraw guilty plea

hearing, the State only argued that Mr. Winn had not shown a just reason to withdraw
his guilty plea.

(See Tr., p.21, L.14 - p.24, L.17.)

Additionally, Mr. Winn's counsel

stated: "I don't see any prejudice to the state in having the plea withdrawn." (Tr., p.25,
Ls.8-9.) Because the State did not demonstrate that prejudice would result from the
withdrawal of Mr. Winn's plea, it may not avoid the granting of the motion to withdraw
guilty plea.
Mr. Winn showed a just reason to withdraw his guilty plea, because there was
newly discovered evidence that could plausibly have motivated a reasonable person in
Mr. Winn's position not to plead guilty. The State did not demonstrate that prejudice
would result from the withdrawal of the plea.

Thus, the district court abused its

discretion when it denied Mr. Winn's motion to withdraw guilty plea. His case must be
remanded so that he may withdraw his plea.

9

11.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Im osed A Unified Sentence Of
Twen -five Years With Twelve Years Fixed U on Mr. Winn Followin His Plea Of
Guilty

A.

Introduction
Mr. Winn asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it imposed a

unified sentence of twenty-five years, with twelve years fixed, because the sentence,
considering any view of the facts, is excessive. Where a defendant contends that the
sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will
conduct an independent review of the record, giving consideration to the nature of the
offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest.

See

State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982).

The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, "'[w]here a sentence is within statutory
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of
the court imposing the sentence."'

State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997)

(quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)). Mr. Winn does not allege that his
sentences exceed the statutory maximum.

Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of

discretion, Mr. Winn must show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence is
excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. The governing criteria or objectives of
criminal punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and
the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution
for wrongdoing. Id. Mr. Winn asserts that his sentence is excessive considering any
view of the facts.

10

B.

Mr. Winn's Sentence Is Excessive Considering Any View Of The Facts
Mr. Winn submits that, because the district court did not give proper

consideration to mitigating factors, the sentence imposed by the district court is
excessive considering any view of the facts.

Specifically, the district court did not

adequately consider Mr. Winn's substance abuse problems. The Idaho Supreme Court
has recognized substance abuse as a mitigating factor in cases where it found a
sentence to be excessive. See, e.g., State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982).
Mr. Winn started using methamphetamine when he was twenty-two years old.
(PSI, p.16.) He reported using methamphetamine up until the time he was arrested in
this case. (PSI, p.16.)

According to his GAIN-I Recommendation and Referral

Summary (GRRS), Mr. Winn "self-reported symptoms sufficient to meet criteria for
amphetamine dependence with physiological symptoms."

(PSI, p.77.)

The GRRS

diagnosed him with "304.40 Amphetamine Dependence w/ Physiological Sx. - In a
Controlled

Environment."

(PSI,

p.76.)

Further,

Mr.

Winn

stated

that

his

methamphetamine use has led to memory lapses. (PSI, p.3.) The district court did not
adequately consider Mr. Winn's substance abuse problems.
Additionally, the district court did not adequately consider Mr. Winn's goal of
getting treatment. According to the PSI, Mr. Winn, when asked what was important to
him, responded that "I would like to try to change my living habit."

(PSI, p.16.)

If

granted probation, Mr. Winn wanted to "go for treatment for my drug trouble." (PSI,
p.16.) At the sentencing hearing, Mr. Winn's counsel stated that Mr. Winn's "goal now
is to get into the substance abuse programming and follow through with more sex abuse
programming, and hopefully get himself into a position where the Department of
Corrections will look at him and say, 'Hey, we can let you out."' (Tr., p.42, Ls.16-21.)

11

Thus, Mr. Winn's counsel recommended a fixed sentence of five years for Mr. Winn,
because "that puts him another five years with an opportunity to do programming before
he is eligible for release." Mr. Winn's counsel stated that "assuming [Mr. Winn] gets to
drug treatment and can stay sober, assuming he follows up with the sex offender
treatment, I think he can be released into the community and can be reasonably
assured that he'll be safe to the community." (Tr., p.42, Ls.2-7.) However, the district
court did not adequately consider Mr. Winn's goal of getting treatment.
Because the district court did not give proper consideration to the above
mitigating factors, the sentence imposed by the district court is excessive considering
any view of the facts. Thus, the district court abused its discretion when it imposed the
sentence. Mr. Winn's case must be remanded with instructions to the district court to
reduce his sentence.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Mr. Winn respectfully requests that this Court vacate his
conviction and remand his case for further proceedings. Alternatively, he respectfully
requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate.
DATED this 6th day of February, 2013.

BEN PATRICK MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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